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INTRODUCTION

In every sport, there are unwritten rules players live by. In soccer,
players are expected to return the ball to a team courteous enough to kick
the ball out of bounds when an injured player needs medical attention.1 In
basketball, the team with an insurmountable lead is expected to wind the

Copyright © 2015 by Michael Flynn.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University College of Law, J.D. Gonzaga University, cum
laude, 1973. The author sincerely thanks Kerry Valdez, J.D. Nova Southeastern University
College of Law (forthcoming 2016) for her superb work in the research, writing, and editing of
this article.
1. Steve Wulf, Goes Without Saying . . . , ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Dec. 15, 2010, 2:53 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=5920306.
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clock down in the final seconds of the game rather than taking a last second
shot to bolster individual statistics.2 Baseball—with its storied and long
history—is full of unwritten rules, so much so that journalists and
sportswriters have begun tracking and blogging about “baseball’s unwritten
codes.”3 Even seemingly ruthless sports such as football and boxing have
their own unwritten codes their athletes follow, with boxers being expected
to salute each other before the final round by touching gloves as a sign of
respect4 while football players are expected to take a knee in the final
minute of a game with a big lead rather than trying to run up the score.5
These unwritten rules are as much a part of the culture of the game as the
real, written rules and all share a common purpose: To instill a code of
honor, respect, and fair play among the players of the game.6

2. Just dribble out the clock. If you have a big lead in the closing seconds, don’t pad your
stats. This is especially appropriate the more important the game is. In 2008, in the Western
Conference Finals, the Lakers led 97–92 with the clock ticking down on the series clincher when
Sasha Vujacic put up a 3-pointer and sunk it at the buzzer. The Spurs had put on a full-court press
but once the ball swung to Vujacic, no defender jumped out at him. It was a classless act and just
about every fan of the NBA chided Vujacic for taking the shot. Top 10 Unwritten Rules of Sport,
REAL CLEAR SPORTS (May 17, 2013), http://www.realclearsports.com/lists/unwritten_rules/.
3. See generally JASON TURBOW, THE BASEBALL CODES: BEANBALLS, SIGN STEALING,
AND BENCH-CLEARING BRAWLS: THE UNWRITTEN RULES OF AMERICA’S PASTIME (2010)
(stating, as one rule, that it is an accepted practice to steal the opposing teams signs but once a
player gets caught doing so, he must stop. As another rule, it is not okay for a player to steal
second or third base in the top of the ninth inning with a big lead. Also, a player should not “show
another player up” by flicking his bat for instance after hitting a home run); see also Cam Martin,
Baseball,
and
Its
Many
Unwritten
Rules,
ESPN
(March
15,
2010),
http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=martin/100315 (describing that one unwritten code is
the expectation of the batter to rush the mound and confront the pitcher if that pitcher keeps
throwing at the batter’s teammates. This is demanded even if the batter does not want to confront
the pitcher, as was the case with Robin Ventura’s half-hearted, but necessary attack of pitcher
Nolan Ryan in 1993); see generally Tim Kurjian, The Unwritten Canon, Revealed, ESPN (May
21, 2014, 12:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10964445/mlb-baseball-confusingcontradictory-unwritten-rules.
4. Wulf, supra note 1.
5. See Top Ten Unwritten Rules of Sport, supra note 2.
6. See Martin, supra note 3 (“At base, [the code is] about ‘three simple things. Respect your
teammates, respect your opponents, and respect the game.’”); Wulf, supra note 1 (“[Y]ou’ll see
that a code of fair play has been passed on to our modern knights, even if most athletes can’t
explain the chivalrous origins of their sports’ time-honored mores.”).
Other sports with unwritten codes include cycling, which dictates that when a fellow rider falls or
suffers a mechanical mishap, the lead rider should wait until the fallen rider gets back up before
proceeding. In hockey, players drop gloves to fight only when both players want to fight. Those
who go after an unwilling opponent earn a bad rep or future retaliation from other players. In
NASCAR, there is a general rule that drivers are allowed to “spy on the sly” but should not get
caught doing so. In golf, players are not to walk through another player’s putting line under any
circumstance. For a list of these examples and unwritten rules from other sports see generally
Wulf, supra note 1 and Top 10 Unwritten Rules of Sport, supra note 2.

2016]

THE UNWRITTEN RULES

75

In the game of medicine, where doctors are the players, an unwritten
code also guides the conduct of medical professionals: Do not testify in
court against one of your fellow doctors.7 This article will first describe and
explain this unwritten rule and its origins. Next, this article will observe the
effect this unwritten rule is having on expert witnesses, victims of medical
malpractice, and the medical profession as a whole. This article will then
examine the steps professional medical associations and state medical
boards have taken to reinforce the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule. Next, this
article will detail the latest state laws that seek to legitimize and further
entrench this unwritten rule into the fabric of any medical malpractice case.
Finally, this article will conclude by suggesting that the time has come to
repeal this unwritten rule from the practice of medicine.
II. THE ORIGINAL CODE OF SPORTSMANSHIP
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The unwritten codes in sports and medical malpractice share similar
origins dating back to ancient times.8 In the world of professional sports,
the origins of the various unwritten codes players live by can be traced back
to medieval Camelot, in which Arthurian knights first began the unwritten
codes of chivalry through the sport of jousting.9 The legendary Knights of
the Round Table brought “an infusion of virtue into jousts and other types
of ‘play’ that were really extensions of battle.”10 Though there was no
official rulebook for these war games, the knights took it upon themselves
to “establish a set of principles based on the much-lauded concepts of
honor, honesty, valor, and loyalty.”11 The more a knight exuded these
principles during the games, the higher his status as a hero became in the
eyes of his colleagues and the public.12 Roughly 1,500 years later, the same

7. See generally Stephanie Mencimer, The White Wall, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story_mencimer_marpar04.msp (last visited
May 1, 2016) (explaining that part of the culture of medicine includes an unspoken contract
between peers never to testify against one another); see also David S. Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 158, 159–61 (1967) (describing that
doctors who testify on behalf of medical malpractice plaintiffs are a very rare and ostrasized
exception to the norm).
8. Compare Wulf, supra note 1 (stating that the unwritten rules in sports originated in
medieval England), with Richard M. Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV.-MARSHALL L.
REV. 520, 520–21 (1965) (implying that the unwritten rules in medical malpractice originated
during the ancient Grecian era).
9. Wulf, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. (noting that traits such as valor, honesty, and loyalty could elevate a knight above
what their skill alone may have otherwise allowed).
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unwritten set of principles persists across the myriad of modern sports, with
the athletes who honor the code of sportsmanship achieving public
adoration and those who dishonor the code, receiving public scrutiny.13
Medical malpractice originally operated with a similar code of
sportsmanship and honesty that also originated from ancient times.14 The
Greek physician Hippocrates—known today as “The Father of
Medicine”15—established The Hippocratic Oath in which every physician
is called upon to proclaim an abstention from “every voluntary act of
mischief and corruption” and to punish those connected with the
malpractice of medicine.16 The Oath itself derived from the Code of
Hammurabi of 1750 B.C., which held physicians guilty of medical
malpractice accountable for their transgressions by requiring them to
publicly own up to their mistakes and to remedy them as best they could.17
This ancient concern for discipline of the medical profession by itself and
by society trickled down through the ages and became the foundation for
modern medical malpractice cases, establishing that defendant physicians
can be held legally responsible for their malpractice.18 Thus, much like the
Arthurian knights established an unwritten code of sportsmanship for
today’s modern athletes, Hippocrates and his Hippocratic Oath established
a code of medical sportsmanship for physicians to follow and enforce upon
one another.
However, while the Arthurian code of sportsmanship has persisted in
sports, Hippocrates’ code of medical sportsmanship has metamorphosed
into a different code entirely. The code of medical ethics in which
physicians are expected to chastise those connected with malpractice exists

13. See id. (describing how Alex Rodriguez was jeered by Yankee fans after taking a shortcut
over the pitcher’s mound in one instance, shouting to distract a player from the opposing team so
that he would drop a fly ball in another instance, and slapping the ball out of another player’s
glove during Game 6 of the 2004 ALCS. Rodriguez’s treatment from fans is contrasted with
Derek Jeter’s frequent ovations from fans and players for following the unwritten rules of
baseball.).
14. See Markus, supra note 8, at 520 (comparing the Hippocratic Oath, the Code of
Hammurabi, and Justinian Code of the Romans, which all address the importance of medically
ethical conduct).
15. Ann Ellis Hanson, Hippocrates: The “Greek Miracle” in Medicine, MEDICINA ANTIQUA,
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucgajpd/medicina%20antiqua/sa_hippint.html (last visited May 1, 2016).
16. See Markus, supra note 8, at 520.
17. See id. (stating that a physician’s fingers were cut off if he caused a person’s death or the
loss of an eye during an operation. Likewise, if the physician “caused the death of a slave, he was
obliged to restore a slave of equal value.”).
18. See id. at 520–21 (discussing the consequences for physicians who make mistakes within
various societies throughout history, from the Code of Hammurabi to early American law).
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more in theory than it does in practice, as more and more physicians follow
what has come to be known as the “conspiracy of silence.”19
III. THE SHIFT FROM MEDICAL SPORTSMANSHIP TO THE UNWRITTEN DO
NOT TESTIFY RULE
The “conspiracy of silence” among doctors embodies the notion that
testifying against a fellow doctor in a medical malpractice case is akin to
betrayal and is grounds for punishment.20 This “conspiracy of silence” has
led to an implicit reluctance from members of the medical community to
testify on behalf of plaintiffs and has established an unwritten rule among
medical professionals of not testifying against your fellow doctor.21
Anyone who breaks this rule is dubbed a traitor and publicly labeled a
“hired gun,” embodying the idea that expert witnesses are for sale and that
attorneys can actively shop for those willing to support their cause.22 In
fact, the problem has become so widespread that the “so-called conspiracy
of silence has been recognized as a matter of judicial notice [across the
country].”23 To illustrate the effect of this unwritten code of silence in
action, consider the following:
The problem for the lawyer is exemplified by a case that arose in
Cleveland which involved a young lady who sustained certain
psychiatric injuries as the result of plastic surgery. The physician
had blatantly advertised under ‘Plastics’ in the Yellow Pages of
the telephone directory with ‘before and after’ nose pictures.
There have been some 20 lawsuits filed against him for medical
malpractice. He had no malpractice insurance and no carrier
would issue any to him. The local medical society knew all these
facts and held him in very low esteem. However, when counsel
requested help from that society in locating a witness to testify
against this man, the society refused to make any efforts in this
direction and said that it was up to each individual plastic surgeon
whether he wanted to testify. When no expert witness could be
19. See Kathy George, Doctor Wants Fellow Doctor Suspended Over Malpractice Testimony,
SEATTLE
PI
REPORTER
(June
6,
2004,
10:00
PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/lifestyle/health/article/Doctor-wants-fellow-doctor-suspended-over1146594.php.
20. See generally Seidelson, supra note 7, at 158–61.
21. See id. at 184.
22. Jennifer A. Turner, Going After the ‘Hired Guns’: Is Improper Expert Witness Testimony
Unprofessional Conduct or the Negligent Practice of Medicine? 33 PEPP. L. REV. 275, 277 (2006)
(explaining that despite recent movement by state medical boards, physician experts testifying in
medical malpractice cases are not held to a minimum standard of accountability, but instead
market expectations from the parties that hire them).
23. Id. at 275–76 (explaining widespread issues with the veracity of claims made by expert
witnesses during medical malpractice litigation).
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found, the case was tried solely on an assault and battery charge
because the patient was only 18 years of age when she consented
to the procedure.
Eventually even this charge was lost when the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a reasonably mature minor can effectively consent
to such a surgical procedure. The aftermath of this story was not
pleasant. The client manifested greater psychiatric complications.
She eventually tried to shoot the doctor and was institutionalized.
Several years after the case was concluded, the doctor was
indicted for double manslaughter as a result of the deaths of two
women in his office (over a two-week period), when he attempted
surgery while under the influence of narcotics. He, too, was
institutionalized.24
As this example illustrates, the effects of the unwritten Do Not Testify
Rule doctors live by can be profound and costly.25 However, the code of
silence typically exists only in instances where an expert testifies on behalf
of plaintiffs rather than on behalf of the defendant doctor.26
[R]egardless of the merits of the plaintiff’s case, physicians who
are members of medical societies flock to the defense of the
fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is
relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or
heroic soul who for the sake of truth and justice has the courage
to run the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners . . . . 27
Thus, the reluctance to testify against a fellow physician stems from
fear of ostracism and a loss of future financial security. “[T]he refusal on
the part of members of the profession to testify against one of their own
[may stem from] fear that one day they, too, may be defendants in a
malpractice case.”28 Doctors also rely on one another “for professional
guidance and patient referrals, so speaking out against colleagues can cost
them associates and impact their bottom line.”29 Doctors’ reliance on one
another for business has also become exacerbated by today’s economic
climate, with more and more solo practitioners becoming unable to keep
business alive on their own.30 This in turn has caused many doctors to drop
their solo or small group practices and join larger medical organizations

24. Markus, supra note 8, at 521–22.
25. Id.
26. Seidelson, supra note 7, at 159–60.
27. Id. at 160.
28. Id. at 158.
29. Mencimer, supra note 7.
30. See Nick Madigan, Doctors’ Dilemma: Physicians Consider Ways To Thrive
Economically—And Sometimes Even To Survive, MIAMI HERALD (June 8, 2014, 7:00PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/biz-monday/article1965640.html.
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such as hospitals or other groups of doctors in order to make ends meet.31
As a result, the prevalence of the unwritten rule of thou shalt not testify
against thy colleague has been fueled by self-preservation and fear of being
cast aside in times of financial difficulty.32
Yet, the unwritten rule contradicts the legal role expert witnesses
necessarily play in the judicial process. In order for an injured patient to sue
a physician for medical malpractice, the patient’s counsel needs to hire a
medical expert to testify against the doctor in question.33 “Generally, the
purpose of expert witness testimony in medical malpractice is to describe
standards of care relevant to a given case, identify any breaches in those
standards, and if so noted, render an opinion as to whether those breaches
are the most likely cause of injury.”34 Thus, the expert witness helps courts
and juries make sense of the applicable medical standard and whether the
doctor in question provided substandard medical care to the plaintiff.35 In
this regard, “the medical expert is indispensable to a medical malpractice
case” and is nearly always necessary.36 Without a medical expert, the
injured patient cannot bring forth a case.37 Yet, in spite of the expert’s
necessary role in malpractice cases, the medical community continues to
target expert witnesses, with professional medical associations leading the
way.

31. See id.
32. See Markus, supra note 8, at 520–23 (noting that the conspiracy of silence theory has
been recognized, as a matter of judicial notice, in several states).
34
See American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 109 PEDIATRICS 974, 974–75 (2002) (“[M]edical negligence requires the
plaintiff to establish the following elements: 1) the existence of the physician’s duty to the
plaintiff, usually based on the existence of the physician-patient relationship; 2) the applicable
standard of care and its violation; 3) damages . . . ; and 4) a causal connection between the
violation of the standard of care and the harm complained of.”).
34. Id. at 974.
35. Id. at 975.
36. Michelle Andrews, Making Malpractice Harder to Prove, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/business/money-medicine-making-malpractice-harder-toprove.html; See Symposium, The Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RESEARCH 383, 384 (2009) (“[U]nder FRE [Federal Rules
of Evidence] 702, expert witness testimony is almost always required in medical malpractice cases
to assist juries in reaching an informed decision”).
37. Andrews, supra note 36.
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IV. PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS PERPETUATE
THE DO NOT TESTIFY RULE
With the advent of increased insurance premiums through the 1980s
and early 2000s,38 medical associations began to feel that increasing
malpractice claims and lofty plaintiffs’ verdicts were to blame for the rise in
insurance premiums, with plaintiffs’ expert witnesses fueling the increase in
costs for malpractice premiums.39 Even though government and
independent studies have revealed that plaintiffs’ experts have little to no
effect on the increase in malpractice claims,40 professional medical
organizations continue to target expert witnesses in an attempt to quash
medical malpractice claims altogether.
A. Medical Associations Take Aim
Professional medical associations have aggressively targeted plaintiffs’
expert witnesses over the last several years, with one such example being
the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (“AANS”). Since its
inception in 1983, the AANS review board has dealt almost exclusively
with plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.41 Since 1983, the AANS has reviewed the
cases of nearly forty physicians, with all but one of them targeting
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.42 The organization has also been proactive in

38. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-702, 9–10, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM
RATES (2003).
39. Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Role of Professional Organizations in
Regulating Physician Expert Witness Testimony, 298 JAMA 2907, 2907 (2007) (“Apprehension
about high-cost malpractice claims in recent years has focused attention on the potential for
physician experts to fuel inappropriate legislation through testimony that is not well grounded in
prevailing clinical standards or science.”).
40. Compare GAO-03-702, supra note 38 (noting that insurance companies raise premiums
based on low investment returns and estimated future malpractice claims), and Katherine Becker
& Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10709, 2004) (stating that a large majority of
malpractice claims do not lead to any payment from a doctor to a patient, with statistics revealing
that three out of four claims lead to no payment at all and only seven percent of doctors face a
claim in a given year, with fewer than two percent making any payment relating to a claim), with
CONG. BUDGET OFF., Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice (Jan. 8, 2004) (noting that
reduced income from investments on the part of insurance companies as well as a less competitive
insurance market were the top two factors found to have contributed to increased insurance
premiums during the early 2000s).
41. Mencimer, supra note 7.
42. Gary Roberts, Silence of the Experts: Professional Medical Associations Are Taking Aim
at Doctors Who Testify For Plaintiffs Injured By Negligent Medical Care. Will The Law Protect
Doctors Who Speak Out?, TRIAL MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Silence+of+the+experts%3A+professional+medical+associations+
are+taking...-a0123577638.
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revoking physicians licenses altogether, with a notable example shown in
the case of Dr. Gary Lustgarten.43 Dr. Lustgarten, a Florida neurosurgeon,
testified against two North Carolina neurosurgeons who repaired a cranial
shunt of a twenty-year-old man who suffered respiratory arrest during
surgery, leading to his death two days later.44 In his testimony, Dr.
Lustgarten stated that the defendant neurosurgeons should have ordered a
post-surgery CT scan on the patient’s brain; further, he noted that the
patient’s medical records did not match what the physical evidence
demonstrated regarding intracranial pressure, suggesting that the two
neurosurgeons neglected to accurately record key symptoms the patient
exhibited leading up to his death.45 After the trial, the two neurosurgeons
decided to report Lustgarten for fraudulent testimony to the AANS; the
AANS suspended him for six months without holding a hearing for Dr.
Lustgarten or allowing him legal representation.46 This ex parte hearing
contradicted standard disciplinary procedures of allowing “the complainant
and respondent [to] present their arguments, often with the assistance of
legal counsel” and allowing the losing party at least one chance to appeal.47
In the end, the complaints by the defendant neurosurgeon to the AANS
were in and of themselves enough to deny Dr. Lustgarten—a neurosurgeon
with no prior history of fraudulent testimony—a fair hearing before the
organization’s review board, costing him suspension from the Association,
and thus his reputation and future business.48
Another illustration of the AANS’s enforcement of the Do Not Testify
Rule is the case of Dr. Robert Rand. Dr. Rand was set to testify on behalf of
Cristine Del Cueto, a patient who received neurosurgery as a toddler and
was subsequently crippled when the operating neurosurgeon severed a main
blood vessel in her brain.49 After seven years of preparation, Dr. Rand
suddenly withdrew from the case, informing Del Cueto’s lawyer that he
could no longer testify.50 The reason for Dr. Rand’s sudden withdraw was
the Do Not Testify Rule set into action—less than one month from trial, Dr.
Rand explained the reasoning behind his abrupt withdrawal from the case
with the following: “I have been informed by the senior neurological
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 39, at 2908.
48. See Roberts, supra note 42 (noting that the AANS initially issued a penalty of permanent
revocation of Lustgarten’s license, resulting in many medical experts coming to Lustgarten’s
defense as having done nothing wrong; the AANS later converted the punishment to a suspension
after confirming its original finding of impropriety).
49. Andrews, supra note 36.
50. Id.
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society to discontinue expert testimony for plaintiffs or risk membership.
Therefore I am withdrawing as your expert.”51 The “senior neurological
society” Dr. Rand referred to in the letter was the AANS, which denied that
it sent such a letter.52 Letter or no letter, the message Dr. Rand received
from his medical organization was clear: Do not testify against your fellow
neurosurgeon or you will be punished. The ensuing result? “Because [Dr.
Rand] was so well known—he had trained many of the country’s cadre of
pediatric neurosurgeons—[the Del Cueto’s lawyer] could not find a single
doctor in the country or overseas who was both an expert and willing to
testify.”53 Consequently, the Del Cueto’s were unable to successfully file a
claim and were ultimately “pushed down a path to settle” for an undisclosed
sum.54 The Do Not Testify Rule and its ugly effects were once again thrust
upon an honest medical expert and an innocent patient.
Other medical associations have enforced the unwritten Do Not
Testify Rule against plaintiffs’ expert witnesses by threatening to publish
the names and testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on the associations’
online accounts.55 One known professional organization to do so is the
American Academy of Emergency Medicine, which publishes experts’
testimony online for the rest of the medical community to see in an effort to
deter “fraudulent testimony.”56 Other groups such as the American Society
of Anesthesiologists publicly announce harsh policy stances towards
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, announcing in their newsletter that “as a rule,
defense work is good, and plaintiff’s work is bad.”57 With medical societies
promoting such propaganda, it is easy to see how medical expert witnesses
continually face an uphill battle when it comes to serving their role in the
legal process.
B. Doctors and Hospitals Organize Ad Hoc
Groups and Blacklists
In addition to professional organizations, doctors across the country
have formed ad hoc groups targeting plaintiff’s expert witnesses. One such
ad hoc program is the “Coalition and Center for Ethical Medical Testimony,

51. Id.
52. Mencimer, supra note 7.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Christina M. Jordan, States Enact Expert Witness Legislation for Medical Injury
Actions,
LITIGATION
NEWS,
Oct.
19,
2011,
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigationnews/top_stories/1901911-medical-malpractice-expertwitness-florida.html.
56. Id.
57. Mark J. Lema, Ventilations: Aliens Among Us, 66 ASA NEWSLETTER 1, 1 (2002).

2016]

THE UNWRITTEN RULES

83

whose website, www.ccemt.org, has an expert witness ‘hot list’ where
members, which include doctors and lawyers, share names of expert
witnesses and examples of what they consider unethical testimony.”58
According to the group’s co-founder, Dr. Louise B. Andrew, thus far, all of
the examples of unethical testimony on the Coalition’s website are of
plaintiff’s testimony only.59 Other doctors have founded their own
insurance company called Medical Justice, a company designed to provide
resources to doctors in order to countersue other doctors who testify against
them.60 The company’s website touts that it will “protect you against
frivolous lawsuits and damage to your good name.”61
Yet another website called “Doctorsknow.us” was formed by a group
of doctors in Texas with an eye towards enforcing the unwritten code of
silence among doctors.62 The website compiled lists of patients who sued,
their attorneys, and the expert witnesses in Texas who testified on the
plaintiffs’ behalf, with the purported purpose of allowing doctors to “assess
the risk of offering their services to patients and potential patients” who
made the blacklist.63 The website had a catchy line that read, “They can sue
but they can’t hide.”64 Although the Texas-born website has been removed
from the internet, it shows the extent of how far doctors are willing to
punish anyone who sues or testifies against them, allowing them to
withhold medical treatment and to stop patient referrals for physicians
brave enough to testify on behalf of plaintiffs.65
Even hospitals have publicly enforced the Do Not Testify Rule.66 For
instance, in the spring of 2004, the hospital management at Tampa General
Hospital revised its employee Code of Conduct to prohibit hospital
employees from serving as expert witnesses or consultants for plaintiffs.67
Yet the code affirmatively states that these same hospital employees may
serve as experts for hospitals and doctors.68 In other words, Tampa General

58. Andrews, supra note 36.
59. Id.
60. Vickie Chachere, Doctors Feel Heat for Taking Patients’ Sides in Malpractice Cases,
FLORIDA
TIMES-UNION
(Apr.
11,
2004,
10:15
AM),
http://jacksonville.com/apnews/stories/041104/D81SKUTO2.shtml.
61. MEDICAL JUSTICE, http://www.medicaljustice.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
62. Doctor’s Blacklist is Blackmail, TEXAS TRIAL LAWYERS ASS’N (2004),
https://www.ttla.com/index.cfm?pg=DoctorBlacklistisBlackmail2004.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Ralph Blumenthal, In Texas, Hire a Lawyer, Forget About a Doctor? N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/national/05DOCT.html.
65. Doctor’s Blacklist is Blackmail, supra note 62.
66. See Terry Carter, M.D. with a Mission, 90 A.B.A. J. 41, 44 (2004).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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established policies prohibiting hospital staff from testifying in any capacity
on behalf of plaintiffs yet simultaneously encouraged them to testify on
behalf of fellow doctors.69 Such blatant prejudice against medical
malpractice plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ expert witnesses shrinks the pool of
experts willing to testify on behalf of injured patients. Even though Tampa
General’s policy was eventually revised to eliminate such prejudice, the
efforts the Hospital made to suppress plaintiffs’ expert witnesses shows the
extent to which the medical profession’s unwritten Do Not Testify Rule is
alive and dominant.70 As the medical establishment continues to make
restrictions on medical malpractice lawsuits its top priority, “it has gone
beyond seeking to limit who can testify as expert witnesses and taken steps
to muzzle them altogether.”71
V. THE ROLE OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS
In addition to the actions of medical associations, state medical boards
have also bolstered the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule by actively seeking
to obtain disciplinary authority over an expert’s legal testimony.72 By
“construing inappropriate expert witness testimony as a form of
‘unprofessional conduct,’”73 state medical boards have established a
proverbial chokehold over plaintiffs’ expert witnesses whose testimony is
viewed with “sufficient disfavor” from a colleague.74
As an example, recall the aforementioned case of Dr. Lustgarten and
his battle with the AANS. After the AANS suspended Lustgarten for six
months without affording him a hearing, Lustgarten found himself targeted
by the same angry defendant-neurosurgeons who issued a complaint against
him with the North Carolina Medical Board, again with the accusations that
he testified falsely.75 The board held a hearing without him or his attorney,
since Lustgarten had been subpoenaed to testify in court in another state
that same day.76 On the strength of statements from one of the defendant
neurosurgeons, the North Carolina Medical Board took the unprecedented
action of permanently revoking Lustgarten’s license, concluding that his
testimony was a “departure from . . . the standards of acceptable and
prevailing medical practice’ and constituted an ‘act contrary to honesty,
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Mencimer, supra note 7.
72. Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 39, at 2908.
73. Id.
74. Doug Jones & Matthew Scanlan, Expert Witness Certificates: Creating Accountability for
Out-of-State Witnesses in Florida Courts, 32 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 11, 11–12 (2012).
75. Mencimer, supra note 7.
76. Id.
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justice, or good morals’ within the meaning of the state’s medical licensing
law.”77 Contrast this case with the fact that a few years later, the same
North Carolina Medical Board allowed five physicians to continue
practicing even after they were found to have “compromised patient care,
abused drugs, sexually abused patients, or engaged in violent behavior.”78
In light of the facts about these five physicians and the board’s decision to
have them keep their licenses, it seems that the North Carolina Medical
Board, and not Lustgarten, was the party guilty of acting “contrary to
honesty, justice, or good morals.”79 Of course, honesty, justice, and good
morals only proved to be secondary to the real priority of upholding the
unwritten rule.
The Florida Medical Association (“FMA”) and the Florida Board of
Medicine have also teamed up to establish a system in which vengeful
defendant doctors have the advantage in filing complaints against expert
witnesses who dare to break the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule. Under the
FMA’s Expert Witness Program, a malpractice defendant need only charge
a colleague with “improper expert testimony” to receive the benefits of an
immediate investigation into the testimony.80 A committee comprised of
medical practitioners screens complaints, “then forwards them to an expert
approved by the Florida Board of Medicine. If the evidence warrants, the
complaints then go before the association’s council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs. After a hearing the council issues a final report that is sent to the
complainant and the expert witness.”81 From there, the FMA board can vote
to suspend or expel the doctor from the association and can ask “the Florida
Board of Medicine to allow complainants to forward the FMA’s final report
to the board of medicine’s complaint section.”82 The Florida Board of
Medicine then has an “arsenal of sanctions rang[ing] from fines to
revocation of a doctor’s license.”83
As it turns out, nearly all of the complaints the FMA receives are
against plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.84 In 2004, for instance, roughly twenty
complaints were filed with the FMA’s complaint system over expert
testimony, all of which were filed by defendant doctors and none of which

77. Roberts, supra note 42.
78. Mencimer, supra note 7.
79. Id.
80. Roberts, supra note 42.
81. Pat
Dunnigan,
Doctors
vs.
Doctors,
http://www.floridatrend.com/print/article/11954.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.

FL
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involved a doctor who testified for the defense.85 In light of the unwritten
rules of medical malpractice, this trend makes perfect sense. Defending a
defendant doctor is seen as upholding the fraternal oath of protecting thy
own, but testifying against a possibly negligent doctor is akin to
treachery.86
This enforcement of the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule extends
beyond the scope and jurisdiction of state medical associations and their
boards. For instance, John Fullerton—a San Francisco internist—recently
sued the FMA and three complainant malpractice-defendant doctors for
libel, witness intimidation, and racketeering after the FMA charged him
with an ethics violation.87 The ethics violation derived from a complaint to
the FMA filed by the three Tampa doctors who alleged Fullerton gave false
testimony in a case involving a man with diabetes who alleged that
negligent care caused him to have a stroke.88 Fullerton—the recipient of a
congressional award that named him California’s “Physician of the Year”
for 2003—received a letter from the FMA accusing him of “‘terrorizing’
the medical profession” and stated that the FMA sought to discipline him
under FMA policy, despite Fullerton not being a member of the group.89
Even though the charges against Fullerton were later dropped, such
harassment of out-of-state expert witnesses demonstrates the desperate need
for medical boards to maintain control over any and all plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses, regardless of their membership or the merits of their testimony.
Contrast the FMA’s and the Florida Board of Medicine’s strident focus
on disciplining expert witnesses with the story of Dr. Peter V. Choy of
South Florida. In 2014, the Florida Board of Medicine concluded an
investigation into the medical practices of Dr. Choy and found him guilty of
“failing to keep proper medical records, committing medical malpractice,
and concealing material facts in the 2010 case of a woman with pancreatic
cancer.”90 Choy admitted to altering the records of the female patient out of
“fear of a lawsuit at the end of [his] career.”91 The patient had visited Choy
five times in two years and during all those visits, Choy knew of the
pancreatic tumor growing inside the patient but never informed her of it and

85. Id.
86. See Seidelson, supra note 7, at 158–61 (explaining that there is a natural reluctance for
expert witnesses to assume “the Judas role” and be seen as a traitor among his peers).
87. Roberts, supra note 42.
88. Dunnigan, supra note 81.
89. Id.
90. Daniel Chang, Miami Doctor Who Falsified Patient Records Keeps License, MIAMI
HERALD (June 11, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1965834.html.
91. Id.
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never made notes in her medical records of the tumor’s existence.92 Then,
two weeks before the patient died, Choy finally informed the patient of the
large, malignant tumor for the first time.93 By then the information was too
late and the patient never had a chance to treat the tumor.94
In spite of all this information and in spite of the fact that Choy had
been previously charged with unprofessional conduct by New York’s Board
of Professional Medical Conduct, had his New York license revoked, and
had previously been fined by three other states for misrepresenting his
credentials, the Florida Board of Medicine decided to let Choy keep his
license, with only a minimal suspension and fine in conjunction with five
years’ probation and mandatory courses on rules and ethics.95 And yet, the
FMA and the Florida Board of Medicine are focused on disciplining nonmember, out-of-state expert witnesses for upsetting defendant doctors?
Something is wrong when state medical boards stridently pursue
defendants’ tattletale stories over the intentional negligence and repeated
deceptions committed by one of their own members before their very eyes.
In the words of the deceased patient’s son, “There’s no integrity . . . . The
system [has] failed . . . .”96
VI. THE EMERGING WRITTEN RULES: TARGETING EXPERT WITNESSES
THROUGH STATE LAWS
In light of the medical community’s harsh stance towards expert
witnesses, it is not surprising that over the last several years, state medical
boards have pushed state legislatures to enact statutes reinforcing the
unwritten Do Not Testify Rule.97 Leading the charge has been the FMA,
which for the last ten years has been lobbying the Florida legislature to
enact unfriendly laws towards medical malpractice plaintiffs and plaintiffs’

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Chang, supra note 90 (The Board ordered Choy “to pay a $30,000 fine, serve a six-month
suspension followed by five years of probation, and attend courses on laws and rules, recordkeeping and ethics.” This decision was made in spite of the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings judge’s recommendation that the Board revoke Choy’s license and impose a $4,000
fine.).
96. Id.
97. See Kenneth Artz, Florida Passes Expert Witness Bill, HEARTLAND INSTITUTE,
http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/florida-passes-expert-witness-bill (last visited Feb.
15, 2016) (reporting that the Florida legislature passed HB 479, placing guidelines on use of
expert witnesses in malpractice suits in the state); see also Jordan, supra note 55 (explaining that
HB 479 adds a requirement for physicians and dentists licensed in another state to obtain an
“expert witness certificate” prior to testifying).

FLYNN PROOF- TO PUBLISHER FINAL.docx

88

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 19:73

expert witnesses.98 The FMA’s lobbying efforts first came to fruition in
October 2011 with the passage of Florida Statutes sections 766.102(12) and
458.3175.99 Florida Statute section 766.102(12) requires physicians who
wish to serve as expert witnesses in a medical negligence case to possess
either a valid license to practice medicine in Florida or obtain an expert
witness certificate from the Board of Medicine.100 Florida Statute section
458.3175 works in tandem with section 766.102 by detailing how a
physician who wishes to testify can obtain an expert witness certificate.101
To obtain the certificate, a physician must pay a $50.00 fee and certify that
he or she holds a valid and active license in another state and has never had
an expert witness certificate previously revoked.102 The certificate is valid
for two years and allows the physician to render medical expert testimony
in the state of Florida during that time.103 The ultimate purpose of the
expert witness certificate is to subject the testifying physician to
disciplinary authority by the Board of Medicine in the event of fraudulent
or deceptive testimony.104 The certification requirements apply to
physicians for medicine,105 physicians for osteopathic medicine,106 and for
dentists.107
A. The Effects of Writing the Unwritten Rule
Although the FMA claims unregulated experts are the cause of
frivolous lawsuits, other medical professionals and malpractice lawyers
suspect the FMA’s real incentive behind the legislation is to stop
malpractice cases altogether.108 While “[a]n expert witness certificate does

98. See id.
99. See Heather Hernandez, Say No to Expert Witness “Certification” in Medical Malpractice
Cases, EDWARD & RAGATZ, P.A. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.edwardsragatz.com/say-no-toexpert-witness-certification-in-medical-malpractice-cases.
100. FLA. STAT. § 766.102(12) (2013).
101. See FLA. STAT. § 458.3175 (2013).
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 458.3175(2), 458.3175(2)(b) (2013).
103. FLA. STAT. § 458.3175(c) (2013).
104. See FLA. STAT. § 458.3175(3) (2013) (“An expert witness certificate shall be treated as a
license in any disciplinary action, and the holder of the expert witness certificate shall be subject
to discipline by the board.”); Fla. Legis., Final Bill Analysis, 2011 Reg. Sess., C.S. for HB 479
(“This bill provides for discipline against the license of a physician, osteopathic physician or
dentist that provides misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent expert witness testimony related to the
practice of medicine or the practice of dentistry.”).
105. FLA. STAT. § 458.3175 (2013).
106. FLA. STAT. § 459.0066 (2013).
107. FLA. STAT. § 466.005 (2013).
108. See Jason Garcia, Efforts to Limit Lawsuits Advance, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 16,
2006),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2006-04-16/news/LAWSUITS16_1_hospitals-inflorida-witness-doctors.
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not authorize a physician to engage in the practice of medicine or dentistry
. . . [the] certificate is [nevertheless] treated as a license in any disciplinary
action, and the holder of an expert witness certificate is subject to discipline
by the board.”109 As a result, the law does not grant experts the right to
practice in Florida but nevertheless treats him or her as though he or she is
licensed when it comes to disciplinary standards.110 This double standard
has already had a negative impact on the medical community and victims of
malpractice by deterring some physicians from testifying in court.111 In the
case of Christian v. Diaco, the plaintiff’s medical expert withdrew one
week from the trial after having agreed to testify three years earlier.112 The
expert witness already had given sworn depositions and was to testify
against Dr. Diaco in a lawsuit filed after the patient underwent a routine
hernia surgery that resulted in a severe infection which left him disabled.113
Yet when it came time to discuss the trial, the expert witness told the
plaintiff’s lawyer that he had no intention of appearing in court while
Florida’s new medical malpractice laws were valid.114 The patient, Thomas
Christian, was consequently left with no expert witness and thus, no trial.115
As the patient commented to the Associated Press, “I’m being held hostage
by my own experts. . . . It’s a blackball listing. They are eating their
own.”116
Further promulgating the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule are recently
amended Florida Statute sections 458.331(oo) and 458.331(2), which add
language that subjects out-of-state expert witnesses to potential disciplinary
proceedings if their opinion is found to be fraudulent or deceptive.117 Yet
the new language abstains from defining what constitutes “fraudulent” or
“deceptive testimony,” which in turn, ultimately provides administrative
problems for the Florida Board of Medicine since it has no framework to
determine what amounts to “fraudulent” or “deceptive testimony.”118 As a
109. Hernandez, supra note 99.
110. See
Expert
Witness
Certificate,
FLA.
BOARD
OF
MED.,
http://flboardofmedicine.gov/licensing/expert-witness-certificate/ (last updated Sept. 11, 2015)
(“An expert witness certificate shall be treated as a license in any disciplinary action, and the
holder of an expert witness certificate shall be subject to discipline by the board.”).
111. Chachere, supra note 60.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Though the issues with the expert witnesses delayed his trial, Mr. Christian eventually
had one in 2005. The jury returned a verdict for the Defendant. See Vicki Chachere, Tampa Jury
Clears Surgeon in Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Apr. 22, 2005, 8:15
PM), http://jacksonville.com/apnews/stories/042205/D89KM6CO0.shtml.
116. Id.
117. See FLA. STAT. §§ 458.331(oo), 458.331(2) (2013).
118. See id.
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result of this ambiguity, the potential for imposing negative bias against
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses becomes exponentially greater since the
begrudged defendant doctor bringing the complaint has more leeway to
shape and define “fraudulent” and “deceptive testimony” to a panel of
doctors who already abide by the unwritten Do Not Testify Rule.119
Moreover, the Florida Board of Medicine—or Board of Osteopathic
Medicine, depending on the individual physician under review—is
comprised of a fifteen-member panel of doctors appointed by the Florida
governor to run these disciplinary hearings and oversee any subsequent
charges.120 The irony of doctors disciplining other doctors for breaking the
unwritten rule of not testifying against a colleague facing legal charges
seems circular in logic. On the one hand, it is not okay for an expert witness
to call out the negligence of a fellow doctor but, on the other hand, doing so
makes it okay for the defendant doctor to take disciplinary aim at the same
colleague? This reality mirrors a twisted version of baseball pitchers taking
aim at an opposing team’s batter after the other team’s pitcher has
intentionally hit his teammate.121 The only differences are, both the expert
witness and the defendant are supposed to be on the same team, and the
expert witness never intended to aim and injure the defendant doctor. He
was merely playing his required role in the legal process.122
With state medical boards and state legislation in the corner of
defendant doctors, it is easy to see why expert witnesses are reluctant to
testify on behalf of plaintiffs, fearing the knockout punch of license
revocation.123 “These professional penalties effectively control expert
testimony, because few lawyers want to hire a doctor censured as a witness
by his own professional organization.”124 Given the fact that it has always
been difficult for victims of medical malpractice to find in-state doctors
willing to testify against their local colleagues, it comes as no surprise that
the FMA and the Florida legislature have chosen to target out-of-state

119. See Courtney L. Rice et al., Raising the Bar for Medical Expert Witness Testimony, DRI
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=458.
120. See Garcia, supra note 108.
121. Martin, supra note 3 (explaining that you do not have your pitcher throw at an opposing
batter without expecting that the opposing pitcher will throw at your hitters the next inning).
122. See Dunnigan, supra note 81 (“Expert witness testimony is critical in medical malpractice
cases—state law requires a medical expert’s affidavit before a medical malpractice case can even
be filed. At trial, testimony from an expert is often the key factor in determining whether the
defendant doctor followed generally accepted procedure—‘standards of care’—in treating a
patient.”).
123. See FLA. STAT. § 458.331(2) (2013) (“The board may enter an order denying licensure . . .
against any applicant for licensure or licensee who is found guilty of violating any provision of
this subsection. . . .”).
124. Mencimer, supra note 7.
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expert witnesses. The legislation promises to create a chilling effect on an
already small pool of available expert witnesses.125 As one doctor put it,
“The question is: If you’re a doctor and making a good living, are you
going to take a chance of losing the right to practice medicine so you can
testify against a doctor who you think made a mistake? Nobody would do
that.”126
B. Additional State Laws Silencing Expert Witnesses
As of 2014, Florida is the only state to require that physicians obtain
expert witness certificates prior to rendering testimony.127 However, other
states are expected to enact similar legislation or already have in place laws
that severely restrict plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.128 For instance, Ohio
mirrors Florida’s expert witness certificate most closely by maintaining that
physicians who render expert testimony are deemed to hold a temporary
license in the state, which subjects them to the disciplinary authority of
Ohio’s board of medicine.129 South Carolina also pursued similar
legislation by requiring out-of-state physicians to obtain a state license
before acting as medical experts.130 However, the proposed legislation was
overturned in 2006 when the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that
the law would “unreasonably exclude the country’s leading medical
scholars” from contributing their opinions and “ha[d] the potential to
substantially impair the orderly administration of justice.”131 Despite the

125. See Rice et al., supra note 119 (stating “these more stringent requirements could have a
‘chilling effect’ on medical expert testimony and dissuade physicians from serving as expert
witnesses in the state”).
126. Valerie Jablow, Expert Witnesses Win Their Day in Court Against Medical Groups,
TRIAL (Sep. 1, 2006), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=151664290.
127. State Laws Chart II: Liability Reforms, AM. MED ASS’N: ADVOCACY RESOURCE CTR.
(2015), http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/x-pub/state-laws-chart-2.pdf (citing the
requirements each state imposes on medical expert witnesses).
128. See Jordan, supra note 55 (recommending similar legislation, the American Medical
Association urged states to require out-of-state expert witnesses to obtain an in-state certificate
before offering testimony).
129. Compare OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.421 (LexisNexis 2015) (“A person licensed in
another state to practice medicine, who testifies as an expert witness on behalf of any party in this
state in any action against a physician for injury or death, whether in contract or tort, arising out of
the provision of or failure to provide health care services, shall be deemed to have a temporary
license to practice medicine in this state solely for the purpose of providing such testimony and is
subject to the authority of the state medical board and the provisions of Chapter 4731 of the
Revised Code. The conclusion of an action against a physician shall not be construed to have any
effect on the board's authority to take action against a physician who testifies as an expert witness
under this section.”).
130. Kesselheim & Studdert, supra note 39, at 2908; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-35
(2011); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-20 (36)(h) (2011).
131. See In re Act No. 385 of 2006, 2006 S.C. Lexis 287 (S.C. Aug. 24, 2006).
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law’s failure, South Carolina’s efforts paved the way for Florida’s latest
expert witness certificate requirement, which thus far has managed to
circumvent the legal challenges the South Carolina law faced.132 However,
the similarities between Florida’s expert witness certificate law and the
failed South Carolina law suggest that Florida may not be in the clear just
yet when it comes to facing future legal challenges.133 For now though,
Florida leads the way in requiring expert witness certificates that subject
out-of-state medical expert witnesses to its board’s disciplinary authority,
with Ohio following close behind and with the possibility of other states
following suit.134
Elsewhere, states are imposing other types of strict expert witness
requirements. In Mississippi for instance, doctors from out of state who are
found guilty of giving fraudulent testimony can be prohibited by court
injunction from testifying in future cases.135 “The state medical board also
can revoke the licenses of doctors who provide false testimony and charge
physicians up to $10,000 for investigating a case.”136 Twenty-eight other
states require that plaintiffs obtain a “certificate-of-merit” or a sworn
affidavit from their expert witnesses, which requires plaintiffs to file an
expert report confirming the merits of a medical liability case before filing a
claim.137 While such a requirement can help verify the merits of a case
before going to trial, it also places a heavy burden on the injured patient
because obtaining a certificate-of-merit can be “very expensive and difficult
barrier to cross” for plaintiffs’ lawyers looking to sue negligent doctors.138
In Texas for instance, plaintiffs carry a heavy burden when filing a

132. See Rice et al., supra note 119.
133. See Florida Justices Cast Doubt on Malpractice Law, HIGHLANDS TODAY (Dec. 14,
2013),
http://highlandstoday.com/hi/local-news/florida-justices-cast-doubt-on-malpractice-law20131214/ (noting that in December of 2013, the Florida Supreme Court declined to adopt
changes to the state’s evidence code that would have gone along with the state’s expert witness
certificate law).
134. See Rice et al., supra note 119 (“Other states will likely look to Florida in the future to
provide insight into the benefits of these additional requirements on expert witnesses.”).
135. Alicia Gallegos, Expert Witnesses on Trial, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.amednews.com/article/20110801/profession/308019938/4/.
136. Id.
137. See Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice Merit Affidavits and Expert
Witnesses, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 24, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-malpracticemerit-affidavits-and-expert-witnesses.aspx (providing a complete list of states with the certificate
of merit or sworn affidavit requirements and their respective statutes); see also Amy Lynn Sorrel,
Texas Certificate-of-Merit Law Ruled Constitutional, AM. MED. NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://www.amednews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/peronalia?id=asorrel.
138. Spencer Aaronfeld, Florida’s New Medical Malpractice Law Makes Suing Doctors and
Hospitals More Difficult for Injured Patients, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2013, 3:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spencer-aronfeld/floridas-new-medical-malp_b_3390016.html.
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malpractice claim because if plaintiffs fail to produce adequate expert
reports within 120 days of filing their cases, they are liable for the
defendants’ legal fees.139 With such laws in place, plaintiffs not only face
the hurdle of overcoming the medical community’s unwritten code of
silence, but they also face even greater financial burdens that extend beyond
their medical injuries, with the possibility of no retribution if no willing
expert can be found.140
Moreover, many states have adopted legislation requiring the expert
witness be in the same specialty as the defendant. According to the
American Medical News, “more than [thirty] states have laws that set
professional standards for expert witnesses in medical liability cases.
Around [twenty-four] of those states require expert witnesses to have the
same . . . medical background as the defendant.”141 In Arizona, for
example, an expert witness must be “licensed in the same profession as the
defendant and maintain board certification in the same specialty as the
defendant.”142 He or she must also “devote a majority of professional time
to the active clinical practice or instruction of students in the same
profession as the defendant for the year immediately preceding the
occurrence giving rise to the lawsuit.”143 Other states such as Florida,144
Georgia,145 South Carolina,146 Kansas,147 North Carolina,148 Arkansas,149
Illinois,150 New Jersey,151 and Tennessee,152 are a few among the twenty-

139. Becca Aaronson, Despite Counsel, Victim is Hindered by Tort Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/even-with-counsel-texas-amputee-is-hindered-bystate-tort-laws.html.
140. See generally id.
141. George F. Indest, Florida Legislature Increases Requirements for Medical Expert
Witnesses—What this Means for the Future of Medical Malpractice Cases, LEGAL SOLUTIONS
BLOG (June 28, 2013), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-law/floridalegislature-increases-requirements-for-medical-expert-witnesses-what-this-means-for-the-futureof-medical-malpractice-cases/.
142. Alicia Gallegos, Qualifications of Medical Expert Witnesses Come Under Fire, AM. MED.
NEWS (May 13, 2013), http://www.amednews.com/article/20130513/profession/130519985/2/;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2604(A) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
143. Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2604(A)(2) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
144. FLA. STAT. § 766.102(5)(a)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2015).
145. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(C) (2013).
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100(A)(2) (2005 & Supp. 2012).
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412 (2005 & Supp. 2014).
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12(a) (2013).
149. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-206(12) (2006) (note that the law was struck down in
Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health System Inc., 386 S.W.3d 385 (Ark. 2012)).
150. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2501(c) (2003 & Supp. 2015).
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53 A-41(a) (West 2014).
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (2012).
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four states with legislation requiring experts to be in the same specialty as
the defendant in question.153
Yet under the previous laws, experts needed only to practice in a
“similar” specialty.154 The transition from requiring experts to be in a
“similar specialty” to being in the “same specialty” may seem trivial, but in
reality, it has onerous effects on the ability for injured patients to have their
fair day in court. For starters, the distinction between “same” and “similar”
specialty has created ambiguity among the medical and legal professions,
leaving state courts with the task of deciphering that distinction.155 For
instance, in 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed strict limitations
on expert witnesses by ruling it was no longer sufficient for the expert to
have expertise in the treatment of the condition; instead, the expert needed
to be board-certified in the exact same specialty as the defendant physician
or credentialed by a hospital to specialize in that specific area.156 This type
of ruling negates any overlap in specialties the expert and the defendant
doctor might have. For instance, the expert in the New Jersey case was an
expert in internal medicine and was credentialed to treat the illness at issue
in the case—carbon monoxide poisoning.157 Despite the fact that the case
centered on the alleged negligent treatment of carbon monoxide poisoning
and despite the expert’s specialization in that area, the court ruled that the
expert was not allowed to testify because he was not board-certified in the
exact same specialty as the defendant, which was emergency medicine.158
Thus, even though internal medicine and emergency medicine are generally
considered to overlap, the expert could not testify based on the court’s
reading of New Jersey’s “same specialty” law.159
A similar ruling was rendered by the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Hegarty v. Hudson.160 The court ruled a board certified obstetriciangynecologist is not qualified to testify against a board-certified family
physician in a negligence case related to the delivery of an infant.161 Again,

153. See Morton, supra note 137 (providing a complete list of states with certificate-of-merit or
sworn affidavit requirements and their respective statutes).
154. Alicia Gallegos, Medical Liability Reform Quick to Trigger Legal Challenges, AM. MED.
NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://www.amednews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/personalia?id=agallegos.
155. See Michael G. Daly, Nicholas v. Mynster: Expert Witness Requirements for Medical
Malpractice Cases are Heightened as Supreme Court Enforces the Patients First Act’s SameSpecialty Requirements, 20 DEF. DIG. 1, 10 (2014).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 29.
158. See id. at 30 (citing Kim v. Ahn, No. A-2285-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1944 (App.
Div. Aug. 2, 2013)).
159. See id. at 10, 29.
160. See generally Hegarty v. Hudson, 123 So. 3d 945, 950–51 (Ala. 2013).
161. Id.

2016]

THE UNWRITTEN RULES

95

despite the significant overlap in specialties between the challenging expert
and the defendant, the “same specialty” requirement limited the pool of
available experts to the injured patient.
As a result, these same specialty restrictions will have “a chilling
effect on the rights of injured patients hoping to find doctors who are both
qualified and willing to come to court and testify against members of their
own medical community.”162 “Supporters of this change in the law claim
forcing plaintiffs to find expert witness opinions from doctors who share the
exact same background, education, and training will encourage early
resolution of claims.”163 But the reality is, “most doctors are afraid to
testify against another doctor who practices in their community and medical
specialty.”164 Thus, “many suspect that the intent and the likely effect of
this legislation is to remove discretion from judges and make it far more
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain an expert witness.”165 In the end, the truth of
the matter is that these laws effectively perpetuate the medical community’s
unwritten rule of not testifying against your fellow doctor.
VII. CONCLUSION
Just as sports have their unwritten rules, so too does the medical
profession. The difference is that the unwritten codes in sports promote
sportsmanship, professionalism, and camaraderie while the unwritten rule
in the medical world promotes secrecy, reluctance, and at times, unfair
retaliation. The new laws passed by state legislatures essentially make
written the once unwritten rule of not testifying against a fellow doctor. Yet
in a legal system where expert witnesses are essential for a plaintiff to file a
medical malpractice lawsuit,166 the new laws are betraying injured patients
seeking to file a claim. The once unspoken conspiracy of silence among
doctors and their medical societies has now become valid and encouraged
thanks to state legislation. The sportsmanship that was once embodied by
the Hippocratic Oath is now buried and gone due to medical societies and
state medical boards exercising their political muscle over state legislatures.
However, these laws do not protect physicians and plaintiffs, as medical
organizations claim. Instead, these laws perpetuate an unwritten code of
silence among doctors in all specialties, and in the end it is the injured
patients who suffer.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Aaronfeld, supra note 139.
Id.
Id.
Indest, supra note 141.
See Andrews, supra note 36.
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As a proposed solution, states should eliminate any special rules for
medical expert testimony and follow the Daubert standards embodied in
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.167 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court outlined a non-exclusive checklist for
trial courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert
testimony.168 The specific factors explicated by the Daubert Court are:
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been
tested—that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in
some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective,
conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for
reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.169
Since Daubert, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence has been
amended to reflect the above mentioned factors so that the courts can act as
gatekeepers when it comes to excluding unreliable expert testimony.170 As
the gatekeepers, trial judges are to assess the reliability of expert witness
testimony based on methodological soundness or rigor, rather than
scientific consensus.171 As a result, the focus is “on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.”172 “If the [expert]
witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must
explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts.”173 Under this level of scrutiny, the courts are
sufficient gatekeepers in weeding out unfounded expert testimony since the
focus is placed on methodological soundness rather than mere
conclusions.174
Moreover, the Daubert standard promotes a greater degree of fairness
than the current state rules for expert witnesses because the Daubert
standard does not impose harsh requirements on plaintiffs’ expert

167. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597–98 (1993); FED. R. EVID.
702 (advisory committee’s note).
168. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95.
169. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
170. See id.
171. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95.
172. Id. at 595.
173. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note, at 400.
174. See Daubert, at 593, 595 (stating that the Court is confident that federal judges possess
the capacity to undertake this review).
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witnesses. Rather than imposing same specialty and same-licensure
requirements,175 onerous certificates of merit,176 or biased out-of-state
expert witness certificate requirements,177 the Daubert standard is an
impartial way for both the plaintiff and defendant to adequately present
valid evidence that can serve their side.178 Such a standard upholds the very
nature and design of our adversarial system, with each side being allowed to
tell their story in a system where the judge acts as the gatekeeper and the
jury acts as the trier of fact.179 As it stands however, the states are
encroaching upon the judicial powers of the courts by stripping the courts
of their gatekeeper roles through unnecessarily onerous rules for experts.180
For those that are pessimistic about the capability of the courts to
distinguish “junk science” from legitimate expert evidence, these critics
should remember that conventional devices within the American adversary
system are designed to weed out pseudoscientific assertions.181 As the
Supreme Court noted in its unanimous opinion from Daubert,182 “Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”183 In addition to these
conventional devices, trial courts remain free to direct a judgment in the
event that the evidence presented at trial is “insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is
true.”184 Thus, both the jury and the trial judge act as gatekeepers in the

175. See Indest, supra note 141.
176. See, e.g., Sorrel, supra note 137.
177. See Hernandez, supra note 99.
178. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–96.
179. See id. at 596–97 (stating that the traditional avenues of undermining weak evidence,
including cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence, remain unaffected by this
holding).
180. See Florida Justices Cast Doubt on Malpractice Law, GAZETTEXTRA (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://highlands.com/hi/local-news/florida-justices-cast-doubt-on-malpractice-law-20131214/
(explaining that the Florida Supreme Court declined to approve the out-of-state expert witness
certificate requirement on the grounds that it potentially violates the constitutional separation of
powers. The Court also reasoned that the certificate requirement poses an “access to courts issue”
and is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”).
181. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–97 (recognizing that summary judgment, crossexamination, and many other mechanisms protect both sides of a controversy from faulty
evidence).
182. Id. at 580.
183. Id. at 596.
184. Id. See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (noting that the
trial judge has the discretion “both to avoid unnecessary ‘reliability’ proceedings in ordinary cases
where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted, and to require
appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the
expert’s reliability arises.”).
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adversarial process when it comes to sifting frivolous or misleading expert
testimony.185 With these gatekeeping methods in place, states do not need
to impose additional special rules for experts since the Daubert standard
embodied in Rule 702 is a sufficient standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony.
Finally, disciplining actions for any testimony that is found to be
frivolous or misleading should be handled by the state licensing boards
rather than a panel of professionals who are the expert’s peers and
colleagues.186 Rather than expert testimony being subject to peer review
and subsequent peer discipline, state medical boards should forfeit this
aspect of self-regulation and instead demand government oversight from
state licensing departments.187 Such a structure would help eliminate the
potential for bias that inevitably is connected with the current peer review
system.188
As it stands, however, the medical community is only adding to the
silence and making it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs’ expert witnesses
to come forward.189 The time has come for abolishing the medical
community’s unwritten rule of not testifying against thy brethren.190 The
time has come to rewrite the laws that make the unwritten rules written. The
medical community and state legislatures need to stop relegating experts to
the sidelines and allow them to play their role in the legal justice system. By
making it harder for plaintiffs’ expert witnesses to play ball with members
from their own medical team, the people who are really being fouled are the
patients.

185. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–97.
186. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 73–96 and accompanying text (citing examples of state medical boards
wielding their power to silence plaintiffs’ expert witnesses).
188. See supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (showing that nearly all complaints
received by the Florida Medical Association are against doctors who are expert witnesses for
plaintiffs).
189. See Seidelson, supra note 7, at 183–84.
190. See generally Mencimer, supra note 7.

